Sunday, December 12, 2010
KingCast about to school Defendants Ayotte, NH and Nashua GOP and Nashua PD on Federal authority to prevent Fundamental Right Discrimination: The Dormant Commerce Clause.
And the law is exactly as Plaintiff urged the Court to adopt earlier, distinguishing the Kay NH case because Plaintiff is not looking to participate, but rather to observe and to ask a few questions. See Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Maryland Chapter v. Town of Thurmont, MD. 700 F.Supp. 281 (1998) (at leagle). That case held that the NAACP -- much like the Kay Plaintiff -- cannot barge in and command a place on the dais, but that's just common sense. An excerpt from Thompson from a 4 Nov. 2010 Journal Entry that Defendants read:
Nor do plaintiffs challenge the Klan's right to hold private, members-only, segregated meetings on private property. Rather plaintiffs contend that the exclusion of individuals from a public rally on private property which is *203 authorized by, and may not be held without, a county-issued permit, is unconstitutional.
That language virtually tracks the language set forth by Plaintiff from the podium at Oral Argument on the TRO but without explicit persuasive legal case citation, as Plaintiff had not yet read Thompson his common sense told him that such an argument is reasonable, and indeed it is reasonable. As to the level of State and Local permitting involved at all three facilities herein, it is substantial – food, liquor, beverage, lodging, entertainment -- and needs Discovery to fairly address, provided that the Court embraces the concept of fairness and equality.
As a New England Zoning and Entitlements manager Plaintiff has worked on some of the same projects (e.g. Omnipoint v. City of Nashua) as Defense Attorney Parent for OmniPoint, and he worked at the Crowne Plaza while he was suffering under a series of bogus, racially-motivated and failed prosecutions brought by Defendant Ayotte. Plaintiff is therefore aware of many permits and licenses involved, particularly at the Crowne Plaza and VFW locations, which of course makes it necessary to engage in discovery as to those matters, meaning that the Motion to Dismiss on the matter is entirely specious.
 As far as the type of Interstate Commerce involved, there is also of course a little thing called the Dormant Commerce Clause that Defendants might want to brush up on, giving the Federal Government powers to regulate activities involving Fundamental Rights. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).